Strand Space and Security Protocols

Yongjian Li


Strand space is a promising technique developed by Guttman et al. Although strand space provides us an intuitive and clear framework to analyze the correctness of security protocols, it seems to us that the mechanics of the proofs tend to be quite intricate and not necessarily easy to be formalized. To the best of our knowledge, no one has ever succeeded in formalizing strand space theory in a theorem prover since the theory was first introduced in 1998. Besides that, we find that few people have extended strand space to analyze real-world protocols such as Kerberos, TLS, SET.

In this web page, we collect our effort to narrow the above gaps in the literature, we aim to mechanizing the strand space theory to support the analysis of real-world protocols. Several papers have been published or prepared.

Case Studies

The Isabelle/HOL proof scripts in the papers are listed below: 

o    The general theory of strand spaces  and case studies on  the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol and the Otway-Rees protocol ( thy files and html files );

o    The extended strand space theory to model timestamp and Kerberos V protocol.

Some notes

  • All the proof scripts have been checked by Isabelle/Isar. The formalizing work on the classical strand space work is done by Isabelle 2004. But the formalization of extended strand space work on timestamp is done in Isabelle 2005. Notice the difference of the Isabelle  version when you want to use these proof scripts.

April 22, 2006